Prior to the 2023 election, New Zealand First campaigned on a clear position regarding waste and landfill policy.
Its environmental manifesto stated:
“Halt creation of any new landfills and urgently advance work on the development of rubbish disposal alternatives through conducting a nationwide recycling and recovery strategy.”
It also promised to:
“Develop a nationwide Waste-to-Energy strategy.”
The policy was framed as urgent.
It suggested a future where waste-to-energy (WtE) infrastructure would play a role in reducing landfill dependence while supporting broader recycling and recovery objectives.
Yet after entering coalition government, NZ First appeared to distance itself from those same commitments.
In correspondence responding to questions about the party’s WtE policy, NZ First media contact Julian Paul stated:
“Generally, New Zealand First has not progressed those policy points as they are not in the coalition agreement and we do not have the relevant ministerial portfolio to advance these points.”
A separate response from the Office of Winston Peters reinforced the same position, stating that following the formation of government, NZ First was now focused on commitments contained within the coalition agreement with the National Party.
At face value, that would appear to settle the issue.
Waste-to-energy, according to NZ First itself, was not formally part of the coalition agreement and had not been progressed by the party in government.
But events since the election raise an obvious question:
If waste-to-energy was never truly coalition policy, why does the coalition government appear to be advancing it anyway?
The most obvious example is the government’s decision to include South Island Resource Recovery Limited’s Waimate waste-to-energy incinerator proposal — Project Kea — within the Fast Track Approvals process.
That inclusion occurred despite significant opposition from the local community, iwi, local doctors, environmental groups, and concerns raised by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment.
At the same time, another proposed waste-to-energy project at Paewhenua/Paewira was excluded from Fast Track despite reportedly being recommended by the advisory panel alongside SIRRL’s proposal.
That distinction is important.
It demonstrates that ministers were not merely passive observers of WtE proposals moving through standard planning channels. Government ministers actively differentiated between projects, advancing one proposal while excluding another.
The contradiction becomes more striking when viewed alongside the actions of Shane Jones.
While NZ First publicly claimed it did not hold the relevant portfolios necessary to advance waste-to-energy policy, Jones has since repeatedly emerged around projects and initiatives closely connected to WtE, energy infrastructure, and industrial development.
Shane Jones, REL, and the Long Shadow of Waste-to-Energy
Jones has for years maintained a visible affinity toward industrial waste-to-energy concepts and companies linked to the sector, particularly Renewable Energy Limited (REL).
That history is politically important because REL is not disconnected from the current WtE debate — it is directly linked to it.
REL reportedly holds a 40 percent shareholding in South Island Resource Recovery Limited (SIRRL), the company behind the government fast-tracked Project Kea incinerator proposal in Waimate.
In other words, the same corporate network previously associated with controversial public funding decisions has now re-emerged at the centre of one of New Zealand’s most contentious waste-to-energy proposals.
The earlier REL controversy centred around Provincial Growth Fund backing advanced during Jones’ previous ministerial tenure.
At the time, officials reportedly raised significant concerns internally about the commercial viability of the proposal. Advice later released suggested officials viewed aspects of the project as financially risky and commercially unsound, with one assessment reportedly describing the proposal as a “lemon”.
The concern was not simply theoretical.
Officials reportedly warned of the risk that public money could ultimately be exposed if the project failed — effectively raising the spectre of taxpayers underwriting a commercially questionable private venture.
As scrutiny intensified, Jones later attempted to distance himself from those warnings, publicly claiming he had not seen or received the full advice from officials before funding decisions were made; however, a staffer of Jones’s later provided the media with evidence confirming Jones had in fact been briefed on officials’ concerns.
The controversy became politically damaging enough that senior National MP Paul Goldsmith criticised the Provincial Growth Fund culture surrounding such investments, comparing it to:
“throwing money around like Pablo Escobar.”
That remark has lingered because it captured a wider concern surrounding politically driven regional funding decisions — particularly where large sums of public money intersected with speculative industrial proposals.
Viewed in isolation, the REL controversy may have appeared to be a historical Provincial Growth Fund dispute.
But viewed alongside:
- SIRRL’s later Fast Track inclusion,
- Jones’ continued advocacy for industrial energy projects,
- his interest in regional energy precincts and Special Economic Zones,
- and his later visits to overseas waste-to-energy infrastructure such as Singapore’s Tuas facility,
a more consistent picture begins to emerge.
Rather than waste-to-energy fading from the political landscape after the 2023 election, the same themes, companies, networks and infrastructure concepts appear to have continued evolving inside broader government industrial and energy policy discussions.
That continuity matters.
Because while NZ First now publicly states that waste-to-energy was not formally part of the coalition agreement, the historical and political trail surrounding Jones, REL and SIRRL suggests the sector has continued to enjoy political interest, ministerial access, and infrastructure momentum from within government circles regardless.
The overlap becomes even harder to ignore when viewed alongside Jones’ more recent activities.
In October 2024, Jones travelled to Singapore where his itinerary included visits connected to the Tuas waste-to-energy facility alongside broader industrial and energy infrastructure interests.
The Tuas development is one of Singapore’s flagship integrated waste-to-energy and resource recovery facilities — precisely the type of large-scale infrastructure increasingly appearing in New Zealand political and industrial discussions.
At the same time, Jones has publicly advocated for:
- regional energy precincts,
- industrial redevelopment,
- Special Economic Zones,
- large-scale infrastructure investment,
- and energy-related regional growth initiatives.
Those themes increasingly overlap with wider government activity involving:
- Fast Track infrastructure,
- fuel security narratives,
- Marsden Point redevelopment,
- alternative fuel discussions,
- and industrial energy proposals.
Jones also holds portfolios and influence spanning Regional Development, Associate Energy, and Associate Finance — positions capable of influencing infrastructure direction even if no explicit “national WtE strategy” has been publicly announced.
This creates a significant political tension.
On one hand, NZ First now says its pre-election waste-to-energy manifesto did not form part of the coalition agreement and that the party lacked the relevant portfolios required to formally advance it.
On the other hand, the actions of the coalition government increasingly suggest waste-to-energy infrastructure and policy pathways are nevertheless being advanced through indirect mechanisms:
- Fast Track approvals,
- regional development initiatives,
- industrial energy planning,
- infrastructure funding,
- and ministerial engagement with overseas WtE models.
In other words, while waste-to-energy may not exist as a formally declared coalition policy, the government’s actions increasingly resemble a government actively enabling waste-to-energy development in New Zealand.
The question is no longer whether waste-to-energy is being discussed inside government.
The real question is whether it is being advanced through less formal — and less transparent — ministerial, infrastructure and development pathways without any clearly articulated public mandate or nationally disclosed strategy.